On Wholehearted Decisions
Аннотация
To complete his theory of free will, Harry Frankfurt introduces the condition of wholeheartedness. Specifically, he asserts that one’s will is free if and only if their second-order volition endorses their first-order desire to pursue that will wholeheartedly. However, many critics argue that Frankfurt’s requirement of wholeheartedness is excessively demanding, as individuals can act freely even in the absence of wholeheartedness. To address this concern, this paper proposes a redefinition of Frankfurtian wholeheartedness by dividing it into two sub-concepts: wholehearted care and wholehearted decision. A wholehearted decision can logically exist independently of wholehearted care. This reason-based decision can be viewed as a form of conceptual engineering that refines our conventional understanding of wholeheartedness. By redefining the Frankfurtian notion of wholehearted decision, we can effectively tackle two major challenges to Frankfurt’s condition: the challenge to his resolution argument and the challenge to his argument from self-defeat.