Levinas’s theory of moral responsibility in Otherwise Than Being is unorthodox as well as puzzling. It is unorthodox because it departs from the widely held belief that freedom is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. It is puzzling because being responsible does not thereby imply that I am forced to put myself at the Other’s disposal. I propose to resolve this conundrum by attributing to Levinas a compatibilist position. Compatibilism holds that freedom can coexist with determinism, in other words, that the two are compatible. Towards the end of my discussion, I will argue that the process by which a subject takes responsibility for its pre-originary responsibility is what transforms Being-for-the-Other into an act of ethical service, rather than one of subjugation. Thus, the Levinasian subject must see itself as the source of its behavior and an appropriate target for moral criticism and self-directed shame, even if the subject is only a proximate, rather than an ultimate (or distal) cause.
A number of philosophers have argued that causation can be indeterminate, particularly in cases of causation by omission such as Sartorio’s Battlefield . In Battlefield , an inaction is followed by the deaths of three soldiers, though...
The article examines whether normativity itself, rather than merely normative statements or facts represented within fiction, can be fictional. The question is distinguished from the problem of imaginative resistance introduced by K....
This paper examines the possibility of unjustified defeaters and the explanatory role of incoherence in epistemic defeat. I reconstruct Peter Graham and Jack Lyons’s objections to Jennifer Lackey’s psychological defeaters, paying...
Common knowledge requires that everyone knows a proposition, knows that everyone knows it, and so on. Lederman’s Sailboat Argument claims that ideal agents may fail to attain common knowledge. The argument appeals to small differences...