Common knowledge requires that everyone knows a proposition, knows that everyone knows it, and so on. Lederman’s Sailboat Argument claims that ideal agents may fail to attain common knowledge. The argument appeals to small differences in how a mast may appear to two agents. Its key premise says that an agent who sees the mast as having a certain height cannot rule out its appearing slightly shorter to the other agent. This paper rejects that premise. Perceptual closeness between two apparent heights does not establish that the lower appearance remains epistemically possible for that agent. Such a possibility must be tied to the epistemic state produced by the agent’s own observation. A revised premise that makes this connection may apply to an apparent height delivered by an agent’s observation, but not to lower apparent heights generated by reasoning rather than observation. The argument therefore fails.
A number of philosophers have argued that causation can be indeterminate, particularly in cases of causation by omission such as Sartorio’s Battlefield . In Battlefield , an inaction is followed by the deaths of three soldiers, though...
The article examines whether normativity itself, rather than merely normative statements or facts represented within fiction, can be fictional. The question is distinguished from the problem of imaginative resistance introduced by K....
This paper examines the possibility of unjustified defeaters and the explanatory role of incoherence in epistemic defeat. I reconstruct Peter Graham and Jack Lyons’s objections to Jennifer Lackey’s psychological defeaters, paying...
To complete his theory of free will, Harry Frankfurt introduces the condition of wholeheartedness. Specifically, he asserts that one’s will is free if and only if their second-order volition endorses their first-order desire to pursue...