This project explores the intersection of two lively debates in epistemology that have not yet engaged with each other: accounts of group belief in collective epistemology and work the nature of epistemic trust. As social epistemology has come to occupy a central role in epistemology over the past several decades, we’ve seen the amount of work on both collective belief and epistemic trust explode. However, despite the literature in both fields booming, we haven’t yet seen any sustained examination of how these currently separate literatures might be intersected and interconnected. This paper begins such an examination. Given the many accounts of both collective belief and epistemic trust, these different literatures can provide different axes along which to vary models of collective trust. Explicating and exploring these different models may serve as options ripe for more examination by social epistemologists.
A number of philosophers have argued that causation can be indeterminate, particularly in cases of causation by omission such as Sartorio’s Battlefield . In Battlefield , an inaction is followed by the deaths of three soldiers, though...
The article examines whether normativity itself, rather than merely normative statements or facts represented within fiction, can be fictional. The question is distinguished from the problem of imaginative resistance introduced by K....
This paper examines the possibility of unjustified defeaters and the explanatory role of incoherence in epistemic defeat. I reconstruct Peter Graham and Jack Lyons’s objections to Jennifer Lackey’s psychological defeaters, paying...
Common knowledge requires that everyone knows a proposition, knows that everyone knows it, and so on. Lederman’s Sailboat Argument claims that ideal agents may fail to attain common knowledge. The argument appeals to small differences...