Indispensable Mathematics and Isolated Universes
Abstract
The Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument is one of central defenses of traditional mathematical realism, which typically posits a single, determinate universe of mathematical objects. It is debated whether this argument can support mathematical pluralism, the view that multiple mathematical universes exist. Jonas ( 2024 ) argues it cannot, claiming that ontologically isolated universes break the transitive chain of indispensability required for empirical justification. This paper contends that Jonas’s argument is flawed because it conflates ontological isolation with explanatory isolation. We demonstrate that while universes in a multiverse are isolated from one another, they are not explanatorily disconnected. By citing mathematical theorems in analysis that currently require cross-universe proofs, we show that explanatory transitivity persists, thereby allowing a pluralist realism to retain a robust form of indispensability.