Economic Theory
Publisher: Springer Nature · ISSN 0938-2259,1432-0479 · 25 articles
-
Bimodal spread majorization: bridging inequality, bipolarization, and polarization in income tax policy
This paper explores the relationship between income inequality, bipolarization, and polarization using the Bimodal Spread Majorization (BSM) axiom, a novel criterion, weaker than the Lorenz criterion, offering a unified framework for...
-
Industrialization, class conflict, and the closing window of democratic opportunity
This paper addresses two long-standing questions in the political economy of development: how the timing of industrialization affects the transition to democracy and how different social classes shape that transition. We develop a...
-
Poverty traps under endogenous discounting
We consider a general Ramsey model with endogenous discounting, dependent on current consumption or future capital, study the monotonicity properties of the optimal path and propose a new narrative of the existence of a poverty trap, an...
-
Moral behavior and polarization
An individual that follows partial Kantian universalization polarizes and overdraws its strategy in order to compensate for those individuals that she thinks do not choose the same strategy as she does. Within a generalized...
-
On the optimal location of public charging stations in a monocentric city
This study examines how the location of public charging stations (PCS) shapes the spatial equilibrium of a monocentric urban economy. We develop a linear urban model in which commuters endogenously choose vehicle type (conventional or...
-
The elusive quest for disarmed peace: contest games and international relations
This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic framework to analyze security competition between two states that can invest in a technology to eliminate their rival. Extending the canonical one-shot game, our model incorporates a...
-
How do sectoral compositions affect the impact of FTAs on global tariff liberalization?
This paper examines the effects of differences in sectoral compositions between countries on the liberalization of global tariffs in the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium sense. Using a static tariff-setting game with endogenous trade...
-
An axiomatic approach to the measurement of inequality of opportunity
We formulate three sets of axioms to measure inequality of opportunity. First, the basic axioms that any relative measure should satisfy. Second, axioms that capture the ex ante perspective, focusing on inequality between individuals...
-
Why Do People Protest? A Theory of Emotions, Public Policy, and Political Unrest
We build a model of policymaking under the threat of unrest. A policymaker chooses how much effort to spend on a public good; effort is unobservable and the outcome conditional on effort is uncertain. A group of citizens protest if the...
-
Disentangling risk and time for optimal prevention
We study the effect of prudence on optimal prevention in two periods with Kreps and Porteus ( 1978 ) and Selden ( 1978 ) (KPS) preferences. We use consumption smoothing as the benchmark and consider risk-averse decision-makers. In this...
-
Berge equilibria – an algebraic approach
Berge equilibrium offers an alternative to Nash equilibrium in game theory, emphasizing cooperative stability rather than individual optimization. Despite recent interest, a systematic study of Berge equilibria in finite normal form...
-
Simple forward induction in monotonic multi-sender signaling games
We introduce a new, powerful, and easy-to-use solution concept called simple forward induction which is implied by strategic stability in generic finite multi-sender signaling games. We apply this concept to infinite monotonic signaling...
-
Optimal sender ordering in sequential persuasion
This paper studies the impact of the order of senders in a sequential Bayesian persuasion game on the receiver’s equilibrium utility. We find that it is always optimal for the receiver to put the more aligned sender before the less...
-
Exact inference from finite market data
We derive conditions for individual choices and $$ \epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium prices to be inferred from a finite set of market data in the following sense: Although potential observations are infinite, inference can be attained and...
-
Wishful thinking is risky thinking
This paper develops a tractable model of wishful thinking that captures both the benefits and costs of optimistic biased beliefs and the behaviors they induce. Building on Bratcha and Brown ( 2012 ) and Caplin and Leahy ( 2019 ), we...
-
On the repeated volunteer’s dilemma with equal cost sharing
We study the symmetric volunteer’s dilemma with binary actions and cost sharing, where the volunteering cost is split equally among volunteers. In the one-shot game, all pure-strategy Nash equilibria involve a single volunteer, while...
-
Optimal reserve prices under seller uncertainty
We justify the prevalence of small reserve prices in real-life auctions despite empirical findings that suggest optimal reserve prices in those contexts should be higher. We reconcile such a discrepancy without modifying the standard...
-
Collective ambiguity attitude as response to individuals’ ones and belief disagreements
This paper axiomatically characterizes the rule of aggregating individuals’ ambiguous beliefs into the society’s ambiguous belief. We consider a family of social rankings over acts which are indexed by pairs of utility profiles and...
-
Generalizing the Pareto principle with endogenous populations
This paper introduces the notion of $$\mathcal {G}$$ G -rules, which extend the Pareto rule when populations are endogenous. Societal evaluations of lives are required. $$\mathcal {G}$$ G -rules compare pairs of allocations whenever...
-
Asymmetric trading costs and ancient Greek cities
Asymmetric trading costs arise when shipping times from point i to point j differ from shipping from point j to i . We show that such asymmetric trading costs predict distinct patterns of location in a class of models using...
-
The Largesse design problem
Largesse design is a positive theory of what happens when players in a game, who have a limited willingness to sacrifice for the common good, can coordinate on a welfare-optimal solution. This theory provides an alternative to...
-
Strategic voting and incumbency advantage
I study a model with repeated electoral competition between two parties. Because there is incumbency advantage, the future electoral prospects of a party suffer when it loses an election and strategic voters have an incentive to support...
-
Measuring differences of opinion: axiomatic foundations, utility representation, and truthtelling
Classical utility theory provides powerful tools for representing preferences over alternatives, but offers little guidance when the objects of evaluation are preference relations themselves. Such higher-order evaluations are essential...
-
Information design in cheap talk
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent...
-
Lost in objective translation: awareness of unawareness when unknowns are not simply unknowns
This paper models decision makers who are cognisant of their own potential unawareness and who may have an a priori sense that not all unknowns are equal. Different types of surprises may be anticipated in different situations, and this...