Economic Theory Экономика и эконометрика

Measuring differences of opinion: axiomatic foundations, utility representation, and truthtelling

Nana Noumi, Linus Thierry, Pongou, Roland, Tchantcho, Bertrand
Springer Nature · 2026-10-08 · DOI 10.1007/s00199-026-01745-w

Аннотация

Classical utility theory provides powerful tools for representing preferences over alternatives, but offers little guidance when the objects of evaluation are preference relations themselves. Such higher-order evaluations are essential for understanding differences of opinion, since the significance of a disagreement depends not only on how two rankings differ but also on how individuals evaluate those differences. This paper develops an axiomatic theory of utility representation for such higher-order evaluations, deriving second-order evaluations of preference relations from observed first-order preferences and providing a foundation for measuring differences of opinion. We introduce behaviorally plausible axioms—independence, disagreement aversion, and symmetry—and show that they characterize a class of hyperpreference relations admitting additively separable utility representations. The resulting hyperutility functions extend utility analysis from preferences over alternatives to preferences over preference relations and allow different types of disagreement to carry distinct utility consequences. We apply this framework to the study of aggregation mechanisms, deriving necessary and sufficient conditions on hyperutility parameters that induce truthful preference reporting and guarantee local efficiency. Our results yield new insights into strategy-proof mechanism design under deep preference heterogeneity and clarify when differences of opinion can be meaningfully and reliably measured.

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