Asian Journal of Philosophy Philosophy

Deleuze on habit: toward a cognitive science beyond prediction

Pablos, Alex B.
Springer Nature · 2026-11-21 · DOI 10.1007/s44204-026-00468-y

Abstract

Within cognitive science, 4E cognition and its subsequent extensions, which I collectively call “post-cognitivism,” have become highly influential. Post-cognitivist approaches challenge traditional models that conceive of cognition as abstract information processing confined to the brain or another central processing system. They instead emphasise the dependence of cognitive capacities on bodily, environmental, and interactive processes. Despite their diversity, post-cognitivist approaches largely converge, I argue, in implicitly endorsing a “habit-based epistemology” shaped by a specific set of assumptions about cognition. Notably, habit is frequently framed in behaviourist and adaptationist terms, thereby reinforcing the view that attunement and prediction constitute the primary functions of cognition. This paper proposes an alternative conception of habit, drawing on a rich philosophical tradition that finds a distinctive development in the work of Gilles Deleuze—a perspective that has not yet been systematically integrated into cognitive science. Deleuze grounds his account in an ontology that can be productively interpreted through dynamical-systems theory, offering a process-oriented view that cannot be reduced to the pursuit of optimisation or stability. Rather than treating habit as a fixed process of adaptation, he highlights its role in differentiation, specialisation, and creative transformation. By bri f both habit and cognition. It thereby complements existing frameworks with a process-oriented and generative account of cognitive nging Deleuze’s account into dialogue with post-cognitivism, the paper develops a more open-ended and creative conception o phenomena.

Read at publisher →