Asian Journal of Philosophy Philosophy

A continuist formulation of Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of Bergson’s theory of memory

Michaelian, Kourken, Boumaza, Doudja
Springer Nature · 2026-09-24 · DOI 10.1007/s44204-026-00441-9

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether Bergson’s theory of memory (BTM)—or, more precisely, Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of BTM—is compatible with or can be rendered compatible with continuism about memory and future thought. It would appear, at first glance, that the answer to this question is bound to be negative. Continuism, on the one hand, holds that memory and future thought are both forms of imagination and thus that there is no fundamental difference between them. BTM, on the other hand, holds, as Hirai interprets it, that both remembering and future thinking involve constructing an image but that the construction involved in remembering, in particular, targets an experience preserved in pure memory; because there is no future-orientated analogue of pure memory, it would appear that BTM is bound to treat future thoughts as differing fundamentally from the image memories that result from construction in the case of remembering. BTM would therefore appear to be incompatible with continuism. The paper will nevertheless argue that this appearance of incompatibility is misleading: BTM can, in fact, be rendered compatible with continuism if a certain presupposition pertaining to the accessibility of durations located at different timescales is rejected. The thesis of the paper, in short, is that a continuist formulation of Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of BTM is coherent.

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