Philosophical Studies Философия

An explanationist analysis of causation

David Mark Kovacs
Springer Nature · 2026-11-21 · DOI 10.1007/s11098-026-02663-2

Аннотация

Abstract The goal of this paper is to offer an analysis of causation in terms of explanation. The basis of the analysis is a plausible principle about “cause-tracing explanations”, i.e. explanations that cite causes: c causes e if and only if the fact that c causes e explains the fact that c explains e. I use this principle to develop an analysis of causation in terms of the role it plays in explanation. I then offer three arguments for my “explanationist” analysis: it scores well on the desideratum of parsimony; it answers the question of what distinguishes grounding from causation; and finally, it offers a compelling synthesis of two seemingly incompatible pictures of explanation and explanatory relations.

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