Review of Philosophy and Psychology Philosophy

Representational Realism is not the Default Position of Cognitive Neuroscience

Fabbroni, Claudio
Springer Nature · 2026-09-29 · DOI 10.1007/s13164-026-00843-x

Abstract

Mental representations figure prominently in cognitive neuroscience, and this prominence is often taken to imply an underlying commitment to robust representational realism: the view that representations are real neural entities bearing determinate content grounded in their physical properties. The present paper challenges this assumption on two fronts. First, I argue that robust realist approaches face principled limitations, such as overgeneralization, and struggle to accommodate the diversity and context-sensitivity of neuroscientific data. Second, I claim that robust realism is neither required nor typically presupposed in scientific practice, as researchers rarely adopt such strong ontological commitments. Moreover, I present an alternative position, representational pragmatism, which treats representations not as discrete entities but as idealized epistemic artefacts, namely modelling tools that enable intelligibility, guide experimentation, and support prediction. I contend that this approach is more consistent with both neuroscientific practice and empirical data. To illustrate these points, I articulate a set of widely accepted constraints on representational attribution and examine varitel semantics, a leading contemporary robust realist framework. I argue that it fails to meet these desiderata and cannot reconcile its commitments with empirical findings. This, I maintain, exemplifies a broader difficulty of robust realism: the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, whereby methodological abstractions are mistaken for literal features of neural architecture. Finally, I defend representational pragmatism as a more viable and scientifically grounded stance that also fares better on representational desiderata. I conclude that if there is a “default scientific position”, it appears more pragmatist than robust realist.

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