A Stackelberg Game Theory-Based Multi-Vehicle Decision Planning Model for Bus Exiting at Bus Bay Stops

Soziale Passagen · Springer Nature · 2026-10-12 · DOI: 10.1007/s11067-026-09794-3

Аннотация

Bus departure from bay stops often involves simultaneous interactions with several vehicles in the merging and adjacent lanes. This study develops a multi-vehicle bi-level Stackelberg decision-planning model for connected and automated traffic. The bus acts as the upper-level leader and selects its departure strategy by considering the combined payoff of the bus and surrounding vehicle group, while five follower vehicles determine individual longitudinal and lane-changing responses through a lower-level game. Safety, comfort, and travel efficiency are incorporated into the payoff functions, and the resulting decisions are mapped to feasible quintic-polynomial trajectories. NSGA-II is used for the upper-level search and sequential best responses are used for the lower-level game. Numerical experiments show that incorporating surrounding-vehicle payoff in the upper-level decision improves aggregate system payoff relative to a bus-oriented criterion. When higher adjacent-lane speeds change the selected lane-changing follower, the coordinated decision also maintains a substantially larger dynamic safety margin. The results demonstrate the value of considering multi-vehicle interactions in connected bus-departure control.

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