Judicial supervision and local environmental governance: evidence from the implementation of public interest litigation pilot in China

Innovative Verwaltung · Springer Nature · 2026-11-19 · DOI: 10.1007/s10101-026-00426-7

Аннотация

Given the inherent tension in China’s local environmental governance, where local governments often place greater emphasis on economic growth than on environmental protection, effective environmental supervision mechanisms are crucial for correcting governmental biases. Existing studies have investigated the effect of top-down and bottom-up supervision mechanisms on improving local environmental governance while paying insufficient attention to judicial supervision. Using the implementation of public interest litigation pilot (PILP) as a quasi-natural experiment, this study investigates how judicial supervision affects local environmental governance. This paper finds that the PILP strengthens local environmental governance. The effect is more pronounced in samples, where there are a higher level of government intervention, stronger promotion incentives for local officials, and weaker legal institutional environments. Drawing on a regulation–normativity–cognition framework, this paper conducts mechanism analyses and finds that the PILP strengthens local environmental governance by increasing the risk of environmental administrative public interest litigation, amplifying public environmental claims, and enhancing government environmental awareness. Further analysis shows that the PILP strengthens environmental administrative enforcement, increases environmental fiscal expenditure, and helps achieve the balance between economic growth and environmental protection. This study demonstrates how judicial supervision alleviates the inherent tension in local environmental governance while reshaping local governments’ environmental governance strategies.

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