Lobbying contests and electoral competition: a model of strategic contributions and policy positioning

Innovative Verwaltung · Springer Nature · 2026-10-29 · DOI: 10.1007/s10101-026-00414-x

Аннотация

This paper bridges classical rent-seeking theory with modern political economy, to explain variation in campaign finance, interest-group influence, and policy divergence across electoral democracies. In the model, interest groups provide political and informational resources, including campaign contributions and policy support, while electoral candidates strategically adjust their platforms to attract and retain support from groups whose preferences are sufficiently aligned with their own electoral objectives. Importantly, this framework reconceptualizes lobbying as a contest shaped by both voter-side incentives and candidate’s rent-seeking strategies. The results demonstrate that policy divergence or convergence depends critically on the spatial distribution of organized interests and the structure of campaign contributions. When lobbying is asymmetric, candidates polarize and move toward their respective financial supporters. However, when lobbying is symmetric or bipartisan, convergence arises as candidates internalize competing demands. It is also found that as more lobbies enter the fray, greater competition among organized interests need not uniformly increase policy responsiveness. Instead, the direct candidate-lobby exchange evolves to a more complex contest, where influence begins at parity, shifts with ideological proximity, and increasingly favors the candidate’s default as resistance rises or lobbying becomes less worthwhile.

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