Continental Philosophy Review Philosophy

“Service without slavery”: Levinas’s soft determinism

Atterton, Peter
Springer Nature · 2026-09-21 · DOI 10.1007/s11007-026-09746-1

Abstract

Levinas’s theory of moral responsibility in Otherwise Than Being is unorthodox as well as puzzling. It is unorthodox because it departs from the widely held belief that freedom is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. It is puzzling because being responsible does not thereby imply that I am forced to put myself at the Other’s disposal. I propose to resolve this conundrum by attributing to Levinas a compatibilist position. Compatibilism holds that freedom can coexist with determinism, in other words, that the two are compatible. Towards the end of my discussion, I will argue that the process by which a subject takes responsibility for its pre-originary responsibility is what transforms Being-for-the-Other into an act of ethical service, rather than one of subjugation. Thus, the Levinasian subject must see itself as the source of its behavior and an appropriate target for moral criticism and self-directed shame, even if the subject is only a proximate, rather than an ultimate (or distal) cause.

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