International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Philosophy

A philosophical defence of limited foreknowledge open theism

Marcus Ackermann
Springer Nature · 2025-07-22 · DOI 10.1007/s11153-025-09961-5

Abstract

Abstract Limited foreknowledge open theism (LFOT) is the view that there are contingent truths about the future but that even an omniscient God cannot foreknow them. This paper mounts a three-pronged philosophical defence of this doctrine. On the one hand, I will show that it can be given a formal model and semantics that is both formally and descriptively adequate. In doing so, I draw heavily on the most recent advancements in Thin Red Line semantics, and ultimately recommend a framework that combines familiar formal elements in a novel way: this places LFOT on a solid logical foundation. On the other hand, I will show that the two most prominent objections to LFOT, namely Todd’s (Philosophia 42(2):523–538, 2014) grounding objection and Arbour's (Int J Philos Relig 73:189–207, 2013) fatalistic objection , can both be met. With respect to the former, we will see that the proponent of LFOT is ( pace Todd) able to heed a suitable grounding requirement for future contingent truths. And as regards the latter, it will be demonstrated ( pace Arbour) that LFOT does not entail logical fatalism. The upshot of this is that LFOT is, at least from a philosophical perspective, perfectly plausible.

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