This paper models voucher systems for welfare services as contracts through which the public sector pays firms to discover cost-reducing innovations. By allowing providers to retain the difference between the voucher payment and their realized costs, the system creates residual claimancy and incentives for experimentation when innovative effort cannot be directly contracted upon. Fiscal savings for taxpayers require that the voucher be set below the cost of public production. Using a two-period model, it is shown that if the government lowers vouchers in response to observed cost reductions, a ratchet effect arises, weakening innovation incentives. The ratchet result remains when the model is extended to include quality shading and costly monitoring. The theoretical results are applied to the debate on profits and school vouchers in Sweden.
Spatial skills are consistently associated with mathematics performance, yet the role of scale is rarely considered. There remains an open question about how small-scale versus large-scale spatial skills relate to distinct domains of...
Credit classification in new or restarted business scenarios is often constrained by low sample size in the target domain and missing attribute values in available credit data. This study proposes a novel transfer learning framework...
This study proposes an Event-Aware Transformer for forecasting WTI and Brent crude oil prices and analyzing their relationship with credit default swap (CDS) spreads. The model integrates a learnable event embedding module that encodes...
Given the inherent tension in China’s local environmental governance, where local governments often place greater emphasis on economic growth than on environmental protection, effective environmental supervision mechanisms are crucial...
As a key institutional openness strategy, the free trade zone pilot policy (FTZ) plays a vital role in promoting urban green and sustainable development. Using panel data from 282 Chinese cities from 2006 to 2022 and employing a...