Thibodeau and the Horrendous Deeds Objection: A Reply
Abstract
Jason Thibodeau has offered a new version of the “Horrendous Deeds Objection” to modified divine command theories of meta-ethics (MDCT). According to MDCT, God has “moral grounding power”, whereby “a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. Thibodeau asks us to imagine the existence of Yod, a being just like God who lacks omnibenevolence. Because Yod is omnipotent, he has the same powers God has. Consequently, if God’s commands can ground morality, so can Yod’s. However, Yod can command horrendous deeds. So, a divine command theory entails the false conclusion that horrendous deeds can be morally permissible. I will argue that Thibodeau’s argument is unsound once we understand what the word “power” means in the locution “moral grounding power”. A key premise of Thibodeau’s argument is false: if God has moral grounding power, it is logically impossible for any other omnipotent being to have it. I will respond to two recent objections that Thibodeau has made to this response: (A) This response falsely assumes that one person’s type-identical commands cannot constitute another person’s commands; and (B) This response makes it objectionably inexplicable why God has this “power” and no other omnipotent being does.