Politically-appointed CEOs, career concerns, and the suppression of firm innovation
Аннотация
A politically induced short-termism perspective was applied to examine how politically-appointed CEOs manage firm innovation. This study highlights the importance of distinguishing between politically-appointed CEOs (ignored as a distinct group in most past research) and other types of CEOs like politically-connected CEOs. This distinction offers a potential resolution to the conflicting findings from extant politically-connected CEOs–innovation research. The politically-induced short-termism perspective acknowledges that all CEOs have economic incentives to promote innovation to demonstrate good management and promote their career, but suggests that a CEO who has been politically-appointed has another incentive which is dominant over his or her economic incentives. That incentive is that the CEO must please the authorities who appointed and are evaluating him or her. This creates an incentive for such CEOs to favor initiatives that produce short-term outcomes, like rapid economic development, over longer-term initiatives like innovation with uncertain outcomes, since promotion decisions will be made in the short term. Data on the appointment of CEOs in Chinese publicly listed firms were analyzed to demonstrate a negative relationship between having a politically-appointed CEO and a firm’s innovation. The relationship is shown to be stronger for politically-appointed CEOs brought in from government institutions and those with brighter career advancement prospects. The findings highlight how innovation output may be unfavourably affected by a politically-appointed CEO’s decision-making biases. Firms should thus ensure vigilant boards or independent oversight committees to check CEO decisions and safeguard against neglect of essential long-term initiatives such as innovation.