A game-theoretic approach for the retailer-third party multiple market-site capture competition in an end-of-life product collection system

Ziaei, Maryam, Ameli, Mariam, Rasti-Barzoki, Morteza, Sadeghi, Somayeh, Mozdgir, Ashkan
Operational Research · Springer Nature · 2026-10-16 · DOI: 10.1007/s12351-026-01121-5

Аннотация

This paper introduces a bi-level game-theoretic model for competition between two players collecting End-Of-Life (EOL) products within a circular economy framework. The model focuses on strategic market targeting in a geographically segmented market dominated by an established retailer. A new entrant (third party) acts as the leader, selecting a subset of nodes to capture. The incumbent retailer responds as the follower, recapturing lost nodes under its own budget. Due to NP-hardness, a Benders cut-based solution approach is developed. The model is extended to a partial interdiction formulation with continuous capture decisions, allowing gradual market entry. A genetic algorithm has also been developed for large-scale instances. A case study on EOL mobile phone collection in Tehran illustrates the practical application. Entry points and defensive and offensive strategies are derived under various budget scenarios. Results show that entry is not always advantageous. As the retailer’s budget increases, the third party faces higher financial barriers to entry, requiring a disproportionately larger budget to remain competitive. In the partial interdiction setting, the model captures nodes fully when the budget permits, reserving fractional capture only when resources are insufficient.

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