The Shapley value for airport and irrigation games

Márkus, Judit, Pintér, Miklós, Radványi, Anna
Central European Journal of Operations Research · Springer Nature · 2026-12-01 · DOI: 10.1007/s10100-026-01039-5

Аннотация

In this paper, we consider cost-sharing problems defined on rooted trees. We refer to these problems as cost-tree problems and to the induced transferable utility cooperative games as irrigation games. We introduce a formal notion of irrigation games and provide a characterization of this class of games. The well-known class of airport games (Littlechild and Thompson 1977 ) is shown to be a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value (Shapley 1953 ) is arguably the most widely used solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey ( 1982 ) and Moulin and Shenker ( 1992 ) show, respectively, that the axiomatizations of the Shapley value due to Shapley ( 1953 ) and Young ( 1985 ) remain valid for the class of airport games. In this paper, we extend the results of Dubey ( 1982 ) and Moulin and Shenker ( 1992 ) to the broader class of irrigation games. Specifically, we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for cost-sharing problems defined on rooted trees. In these characterization results, we relate the terminology of transferable utility games to that of cost-sharing problems, thereby establishing a bridge between the two fields.

Читать у издателя →

Похожие статьи