Tax Avoidance and Tax Base Risk in the Choice of Pre-Tax and After-Tax Performance Measures
Аннотация
In this paper, we analyze how tax avoidance and tax base risk affect the choice of pre-tax and after-tax performance measures in managerial incentive contracts. We consider an agency setting in which the principal is responsible for tax avoidance decisions, and both the principal and the agent face tax base risks. We show that the optimal performance measure (after-tax or pre-tax profit) depends on the measures’ information content about effort and on the net benefit of tax avoidance. With respect to information content, transitioning from a pre-tax measure to an after-tax measure introduces additional compensation risk, but may also provide additional insurance against the agent’s tax base risk. The net benefit of tax avoidance, in contrast, is always higher under the pre-tax measure. We demonstrate that the after-tax measure can be optimal only if the insurance effect outweighs both the additional compensation risk and the loss from the lower net benefit of tax avoidance. Furthermore, we show that while pay-performance sensitivity under the after-tax measure varies (positively or negatively) with the costs of tax avoidance, it is independent of these costs under the pre-tax measure. Our results imply that the complexity of tax rules, pro- or counter-cyclical tax policies, and constraints on tax avoidance affect the choice of the optimal performance measure. In particular, complex tax rules and weak constraints on tax avoidance favor the use of pre-tax measures, while counter-cyclical tax policies may favor after-tax measures.