Subsidy for the first hires and firm performance
Аннотация
This paper studies how employment subsidies for start-ups shape their performance. We exploit an unexpected policy reform in Belgium that permanently exempted start-ups hiring their first employee from payroll taxes for that employee. Using firm-level administrative data and a regression-discontinuity-in-time design, we find that subsidized post-reform start-ups employed fewer workers and generated lower output, value added, and profits compared to pre-reform start-ups. However, post-reform start-ups were more likely to survive as employers. These effects emerged within the first year after hiring and remained stable over a medium horizon of 3 years. Our findings indicate a compositional shift: the subsidy primarily induced low-productivity firms to enter the market. As most firms nowadays are nonemployers, our results meaningfully generalize the theoretical implications of standard neoclassical entrepreneurship models (addressing the employee–employer margin) and fill the important gap of the nonemployer–employer margin. Belgium’s government support for small businesses’ hiring mainly led to the entry of low-growth start-ups rather than high-growth scale-ups. This study examines whether reducing entry labor costs can help foster successful new employer firms on average. In 2016, Belgium introduced an exemption from payroll taxes for first-time employers hiring their first employees. By comparing firms before and after the reform, we find that subsidized firms hired fewer employees and generated lower output and profits. However, these firms were more likely to survive than pre-reform firms. This smaller firm size reflects the entry of less productive firms that were only able to afford their first hires because of the reform.