In transboundary river basins, achieving spontaneous cooperation over water between upstream and downstream nations is often challenging due to conflicting interests under water scarcity, especially in the absence of intergovernmental water cooperation organizations (IWCOs). Existing studies frequently assume IWCOs act as strong reciprocators, yet they often overlook the associated regulatory costs, as well as the coexistence of conflict and cooperation among riparian countries. This study develops a tripartite game model that incorporates upstream nations as water suppliers, downstream nations as water users, and an IWCO as the regulator. By integrating factors such as water supply benefits, water utilization benefits, speculative gains, and regulatory measures, the model is applied to the Lancang–Mekong River Basin. The results indicate that: First, the IWCO acts as a cost-sensitive “catalyst”; high supervision costs may lead it to adopt “weak regulation,” yet cooperation can still spontaneously emerge when driven by sufficient shared interests. Second, conflict and cooperation are not mutually exclusive but co-evolve across distinct phases; early-stage conflict acts as a functional signal triggering necessary intervention, which eventually transitions into stable cooperation sustained by later-stage benefit-sharing. Third, stability is threatened by speculative micro-conflicts, which can be suppressed through a precise mechanism combining targeted penalties and incentives. This study provides a structured framework for achieving sustainable transboundary water management.
Wang, Weiwei, Zhang, Hengjie, Zhang, Muzi et al. Promoting Transboundary Water Cooperation Under Scarcity: The Role of Intergovernmental Regulatory Costs and Measures. // Group Decision and Negotiation. – 2026. – DOI: 10.1007/s10726-026-10010-3. – URL: http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s10726-026-10010-3
Wang, Weiwei, Zhang, Hengjie, Zhang, Muzi, Gu, Hongbin, Zhou, Lin, Yang, Xueqian, Chen, Changgao, Fang, & Zhou (2026). Promoting Transboundary Water Cooperation Under Scarcity: The Role of Intergovernmental Regulatory Costs and Measures. Group Decision and Negotiation. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-026-10010-3
Wang, et al. “Promoting Transboundary Water Cooperation Under Scarcity: The Role of Intergovernmental Regulatory Costs and Measures.” Group Decision and Negotiation, 2026. doi:10.1007/s10726-026-10010-3.
@article{Wang2026,
title = {Promoting Transboundary Water Cooperation Under Scarcity: The Role of Intergovernmental Regulatory Costs and Measures},
author = {Wang and Weiwei and Zhang and Hengjie and Zhang and Muzi and Gu and Hongbin and Zhou and Lin and Yang and Xueqian and Chen and Changgao and Fang and Zhou},
journal = {Group Decision and Negotiation},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s10726-026-10010-3},
url = {http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s10726-026-10010-3}
}
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