E-retailer channel selection in live-streaming commerce: balancing traffic attraction and information disclosure
Аннотация
Live-streaming commerce allows e-retailers to attract new consumers, but it also provides valuation-relevant information that can make consumers more selective. This paper studies an e-retailer’s channel-entry and pricing decisions when a live broadcast channel simultaneously generates additional traffic and discloses noisy information about consumers’ true valuations for a new product. In our model, consumers in the original channel are initially uncertain about their match values and purchase based on their prior expected valuation. If the retailer opens the live broadcast channel, newly attracted consumers and informed consumers from the original channel can watch the live stream and update their valuations, whereas uninformed consumers remain in the original channel. We show that live-channel entry is governed by a tradeoff between traffic attraction and information disclosure. Although the live broadcast channel expands market reach, more accurate information induces low-valuation consumers to exit and weakens the retailer’s pricing power. Consequently, the retailer’s profit decreases with information accuracy, and entry is profitable only when the traffic-attraction effect is sufficiently strong. We further show that the retailer’s optimal price is non-monotonic in information accuracy because demand preservation, value exploitation, and convergence incentives dominate in different regions. Welfare analysis shows that live-channel entry always increases consumer surplus but may reduce social welfare when information disclosure is strong. Finally, channel-based differentiated pricing can improve both retailer profit and consumer surplus by separating prices across informed and uninformed consumers.