In a Nash equilibrium, no player can gain by unilaterally deviating. In many practical settings, however, players can also choose when to act, and delaying may be profitable because it allows a player to move last and respond to others (for example, waiting for competitors to announce prices before setting one’s own). We ask whether one can select a Nash equilibrium in which no player has an incentive to delay intentionally. To address this, we introduce punctually stable Nash-equilibrium, that is, a Nash equilibrium with the additional property that intentional tardiness is not advantageous. We study existence of punctually stable Nash-equilibria in potential games and aggregative games. Remarkably, in some environments, all-player punctuality can be achieved without explicitly penalizing late arrivals.
Gusev, Vasily. The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games. // Operational Research. – 2026. – DOI: 10.1007/s12351-026-01111-7. – URL: http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s12351-026-01111-7
Gusev & Vasily (2026). The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games. Operational Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-026-01111-7
Gusev and Vasily. “The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games.” Operational Research, 2026. doi:10.1007/s12351-026-01111-7.
@article{Gusev2026,
title = {The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games},
author = {Gusev and Vasily},
journal = {Operational Research},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s12351-026-01111-7},
url = {http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s12351-026-01111-7}
}
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