Stablecoin depegging, financial intermediary balance sheet constraints, and liquidity in the U.S. traditional money market
Abstract
As the stablecoin market has expanded rapidly, its links with the U.S. money market have strengthened. This paper examines the dynamic relationship between stablecoin depegging and U.S. money market liquidity. We develop an analytical framework incorporating stablecoins and characterizing how depegging may affect traditional money markets through financial intermediaries’ balance sheet constraints. Using local projections, we find distinct responses across three markets: Treasury bill liquidity improves initially before reversing; commercial paper liquidity deteriorates significantly on the shock day; and repo liquidity worsens with a delayed peak. These responses vary with intermediary capital conditions. When intermediary capital is relatively constrained, Treasury bill liquidity tends to deteriorate more after the initial response, while the difference in commercial paper liquidity is concentrated mainly on the shock day; the repo market shows no significant difference across capital states. These findings provide empirical evidence on risk linkages between crypto-asset and traditional money markets.