Bureaucratic Interests: Does Fiscal Decentralization Impede Efficient Governance?
Yuxing (Nemo) Chen
Politics and Policy
· Wiley
· 2026-10-11
· DOI: 10.1111/polp.70173
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Citation
Yuxing (Nemo) Chen. Bureaucratic Interests: Does Fiscal Decentralization Impede Efficient Governance?. // Politics and Policy. – 2026. – DOI: 10.1111/polp.70173. – URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.70173?af=R
Yuxing (Nemo) Chen (2026). Bureaucratic Interests: Does Fiscal Decentralization Impede Efficient Governance?. Politics and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70173
Yuxing (Nemo) Chen. “Bureaucratic Interests: Does Fiscal Decentralization Impede Efficient Governance?.” Politics and Policy, 2026. doi:10.1111/polp.70173.
@article{Chen2026,
title = {Bureaucratic Interests: Does Fiscal Decentralization Impede Efficient Governance?},
author = {Chen, Yuxing (Nemo)},
journal = {Politics and Policy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/polp.70173},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.70173?af=R}
}