Intergenerational succession and investment efficiency in Chinese family firms
Abstract
This study examines the impact of intergenerational succession on investment efficiency in Chinese family firms, where second-generation successors face significant challenges in establishing legitimacy amid com-plex governance dynamics. Using data from Chinese A-share listed family firms, we demonstrate that second generation involvement reduces the new investment scale while significantly improving investment efficiency, primarily through curbing overinvestment. Crucially, this efficiency gain does not come at the expense of innovation: while successors selectively reduce exploitative innovation in high-tech industries, they preserve exploratory innovation, and invention patent applications marginally increase, suggesting improved innovation efficiency rather than innovation suppression. The positive effect is most pronounced when successors assume core management roles during cogovernance stages and intensifies with extended joint leadership duration, whereas excessive family management involvement undermines these benefits. Further analyses reveal important boundary conditions: the effect is stronger in policy-supported strategic emerging industries and in mature-stage firms, whereas growth-stage firms require more strategic slack. The positive effect of second-generation involvement on investment efficiency is attenuated in strategic emerging industries, reflecting the need for strategic investment in these sectors. This study shows that successors adopt a selective optimization strategy—curbing inefficient exploitation while preserving exploration, which is essential for long-term competitiveness. These findings offer a nuanced understanding of how legitimacy construction and authority transfer shape resource allocation efficiency during succession.