Bribe to win? Performance implications of firms’ bribery spending

Chen, Ziyi, Wu, Rui, Xie, Zhenzhen, Li, Jiatao
Asia Pacific Journal of Management · Springer Nature · 2026-10-13 · DOI: 10.1007/s10490-026-10199-6

Abstract

Despite the debate over whether bribery serves as grease or sand to economic activities, less research has examined how bribery influences a firm’s performance when its benefits and costs are jointly evaluated. Drawing on resource dependence theory, we propose that bribery may help firms manage their dependence on resources controlled by local regulators and improve access to those resources; yet escalating spending on this illicit tactic may increasingly expose firms to relationship lock-in, political vulnerability, and resource-diversion costs. As bribery spending increases, its costs eventually outweigh its benefits, producing an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. When firms have alternative ways to countervail their dependence on politically controlled resources, the performance consequences of bribery become weaker, and the relationship between bribery spending and firm performance becomes flatter. Our empirical findings, based on 189,846 private firms in China during 2003–2007, support these arguments. Specifically, we find that the inverted U-shaped impact of bribery spending on firm performance is flatter for firms that collect a larger proportion of revenue from overseas markets and for those with more intensive intangible assets.

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