Stakeholder accountability in the case of the collapse of a public private partnership (PPP) service provider

Abdullah, Aminah, Khadaroo, Iqbal
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance · Springer Nature · 2026-11-17 · DOI: 10.1057/s41310-026-00440-5

Abstract

The main objective of this study is to examine stakeholder accountability in the case of the collapse of a public private partnership (PPP) service provider. Whilst PPPs have been embraced by governments across the globe to modernise public services by using value for money and risk transfer arguments which have been the subject of numerous studies, limited attention has been provided to examining how accountability to stakeholders is discharged when a PPP service provider collapses. This study adopts a qualitative case study of Carillion, which was a large UK multinational construction and facilities management company providing PPP services to the public sector, and uses evidence from UK Parliamentary inquiry transcripts, financial statements, and regulatory reports. Data were analysed to examine the discharge of accountability expectations of key stakeholders, and the role of accounting and oversight mechanisms in governance and accountability processes. The findings show that systemic failures in PPP governance and accountability processes enabled Carillion’s executives to take on excessive risks that were externalised onto public and private sector stakeholders. Executives, in their quest for growth and profits, ventured into risky PPP contracts which they did not comprehend, aggressively accounted for revenues, cut costs by squeezing suppliers, and made inadequate provisions for pension liabilities to employees. Accountability to stakeholders was compromised by information asymmetry and weak oversight mechanisms. Rather than challenge executives, Carillion’s board of non-executive directors, auditor and regulators conferred legitimacy to Carillion. PPP risk transfer proved illusory, as the public sector partner ultimately assumed responsibility for maintaining the provision of public services to users following the collapse. The findings show that the consequences of failure were disproportionately borne by employees, suppliers and the public sector users, indicating weak downward accountability and the externalisation of risks. This study extends stakeholder accountability theory to PPP collapse, and conceptualises accountability as multi-directional, contested and shaped by power asymmetries. It demonstrates how accountability mechanisms, such as financial reporting, governance structures, audit and regulation, legitimise organisational narratives, and provides new insights into the distributional consequences of corporate failure and challenges risk transfer and accountability arguments in PPP contracts.

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