Paying for disclosure: a tax-linked incentive and the bifurcation of a voluntary corporate reporting regime: evidence from Korea’s corporate value-up programme

Kwon, Gee-Jung
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance · Springer Nature · 2026-11-11 · DOI: 10.1057/s41310-026-00438-z

Abstract

In recent years, governments in East Asia have tried to raise the market valuation of listed firms by asking them to disclose how they plan to increase corporate value. Japan began such a programme in 2023 and Korea followed in 2024. In both countries, disclosure was voluntary, and progress was reported as the number of firms that disclosed. Accounting research has long asked whether voluntary disclosure carries real content or only signals compliance. However, it has studied this question mainly in private voluntary regimes and under legal mandates, and it has looked for the gap between disclosure and content within individual firms. It has not examined what happens when a government attaches a financial incentive to a voluntary disclosure regime. This study examines that case. In February 2026, shortly after a guideline revision had simplified the filing, Korea made filing under the value-up programme a condition for shareholders to receive a dividend tax benefit. Each filing consists of a short structured form and an optional plan document, so whether a firm actually wrote a plan document can be observed directly. Using all 890 first-instance filings by 750 firms from May 2024 to July 2026 and the content of 328 of the 342 plan documents attached to them, we find that the number of filing firms rose from 183 to 589 within one month, while the share of filings with a plan document fell from 99.5 per cent to 18.6 per cent. The decline came mostly from firms filing for the first time. The share of filings with a plan document was also much lower among firms that qualified for the tax benefit (16.4 per cent) than among firms clearly outside the eligibility criteria (60.7 per cent). As a result, firms that never produced a plan document paid ₩18.51 trillion, or 49.6 per cent, of the ₩37.35 trillion in fiscal 2025 dividends paid by firms that qualified for the benefit. The plan documents that were still written did not contain less: seven of nine content measures are statistically equivalent before and after the change, both among the 282 documents whose text was read directly and across all 328 once the text-extraction method is held constant. The incentive therefore increased participation by bringing in a new group of firms that filed the form without a plan document, while the firms that continued to write plan documents kept their content. We call this pattern bifurcation. It shows that the gap between disclosure and content can arise between groups of firms rather than within each firm, and that participation counts can overstate the progress of such programmes.

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