The transparency dilemma around single-name credit default swaps: a critical analysis of the MiFIR review and its potential regulatory implications
Abstract
This article discusses Regulation (EU) 2024/791 (“MiFIR Review”) concerning the transparency requirement for single-name credit default swaps and concludes that European legislators may have made the transparency requirements more stringent at first sight, but that in the end, the MiFIR Review is not that far-reaching in making these derivatives more transparent. Indeed, single-name CDSs not referring to Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBS) are not significantly impacted, and those referring to G-SIBS but not centrally cleared could also remain opaque. Yet, this article claims that more transparency than what the MiFIR Review envisages might even not be beneficial for market quality in the first place. In the case of a market in which few buyers and sellers are willing to trade continuously, more transparency could lead to even less liquidity. In case of enhanced transparency, the limited number of available liquidity providers would be obliged to make their trading strategies available, which gives them incentives to trade even less. Given the ongoing debate on the trade-offs between transparency and liquidity, the MiFIR Review serves as a case study in regulatory calibration, illustrating that full transparency might not always be desirable and that a tailored approach may better serve the stability and efficiency of financial markets.