The impact of decision-making sequences on national and store brand competition: a game theoretic approach

Ajorlo, Saeid, Taleizadeh, Ata Allah, Konstantaras, Ioannis, Yaghoubi, Saeed
Operational Research · Springer Nature · 2026-10-16 · DOI: 10.1007/s12351-026-01093-6

Abstract

This paper examines how decision-making sequences influence pricing and advertising strategies in a dual-brand supply chain consisting of a national brand (NB) manufacturer and a retailer offering a competing store brand (SB). The manufacturer engages in national advertising, while the retailer conducts local advertising, creating asymmetric promotional effects. We develop a game-theoretic model under a Stackelberg structure to analyze three strategic scenarios: simultaneous decision-making, advertising-first, and pricing-first sequences. The results show that the decision timing significantly influences equilibrium outcomes, profit distribution, and market competition intensity. In particular, simultaneous decision-making maximizes the manufacturer’s profit and overall system performance, whereas pricing-first strategies provide greater stability for the retailer under strong advertising spillover effects. Sensitivity analyses further demonstrate that advertising effectiveness plays a critical role in shaping optimal strategies and profit trade-offs. These findings offer both theoretical insights and practical implications for firms managing national and store brand competition under advertising interactions.

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