Government subsidy policy and farmer’s live-streaming strategy in the fresh agricultural products supply chain
Abstract
Live-streaming serves as an effective means to promote the sales of fresh agricultural products. Farmers cooperate with streamers for live-streaming through the direct or resale live-streaming strategy. The third-party logistics service provider offers cold-chain services to maintain the freshness of agricultural products. Meanwhile, the government provides subsidies to farmers, streamers, or consumers. Motivated by this background, this study investigates a farmer’s choice of live-streaming strategy and its impact on other supply chain members. We find that, first, when streamer traffic is high, the farmer should adopt the resale live-streaming strategy. When streamer traffic is low, the farmer should adopt the direct live-streaming strategy if the government subsidizes farmers or consumers; if the government subsidizes streamers, the farmer’s decision on live-streaming strategy is also affected by unit subsidy. Second, the high-traffic streamer always prefers the resale live-streaming strategy, whereas the low-traffic streamer’s preference for the live-streaming strategy depends on the government subsidy policy. Finally, if streamer traffic is low (high) and subsidy is low, the government can promote the sales of fresh agricultural products, increase the farmer’s profit, and improve social welfare by subsidizing farmers (streamers); otherwise, subsidizing consumers may improve social welfare, but it is not conducive to the sales of fresh agricultural products or farmer’s profit. Furthermore, we conduct an extension study with an endogenous subsidy to verify the robustness of the main results.