A decision support system for voting mechanism selection in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

Leduc, Cyprien, Bouraga, Sarah
Electronic Markets · Springer Nature · 2026-11-05 · DOI: 10.1007/s12525-026-00951-7

Abstract

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) represent a rapidly growing organizational form in the Web3 ecosystem, with over 13,000 active organizations managing billions in digital assets. In these blockchain-based entities, governance rights are tokenized and tradeable, creating electronic markets where voting mechanisms aggregate preferences across distributed token holders. DAO designers face a critical challenge: selecting appropriate voting mechanisms from an expanding set of alternatives, each with distinct trade-offs regarding security, efficiency, and democratic values. Poor mechanism selection has contributed to documented governance failures, including the $50 M DAO hack, plutocratic capture, and widespread participation collapse. Despite the proliferation of voting mechanisms and governance challenges, practitioners lack systematic frameworks for mechanism selection. This research develops a decision support system for voting mechanism selection in DAOs using Design Science Research methodology. Through literature review and expert interviews, we identify ten decision criteria influencing mechanism appropriateness and construct an evaluation framework integrating mechanism taxonomy, criteria-mechanism mappings, scoring algorithm, and requirements elicitation tools. We demonstrate the framework through application to three case studies.

Read at publisher →

Similar articles