Public Choice Sociology and Political Science
A theory of conspiracy theories
Abstract
This paper develops a tractable equilibrium model of conspiracy belief based on rational inattention and endogenous information supply. Citizens choose costly precision when processing competing narratives: an official signal whose precision depends on institutional quality and a strategically supplied alternative narrative whose perceived precision depends on narrative intensity and residual bias uncertainty. Conspiracy belief arises as an equilibrium outcome of this interaction. The model generates comparative statics that organize cross-country variation in belief prevalence linked to income, education, and institutional quality. It delivers three main predictions: education mitigates the effects of weak institutions, corruption can have convex effects on belief formation, and institutional thresholds can render official information ineffective. The framework also implies endogenous amplification of misinformation and disinformation in weak institutional environments, providing a micro-founded explanation for persistent cross-country differences in belief formation and informational resilience.