Luca Anderlini, GaOn Kim. Tournament auctions with a strong limit bidder. // Review of Economic Design. – 2026. – DOI: 10.1007/s10058-026-00400-z. – URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-026-00400-z
Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim (2026). Tournament auctions with a strong limit bidder. Review of Economic Design. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-026-00400-z
Luca Anderlini and GaOn Kim. “Tournament auctions with a strong limit bidder.” Review of Economic Design, 2026. doi:10.1007/s10058-026-00400-z.
@article{Anderlini2026,
title = {Tournament auctions with a strong limit bidder},
author = {Anderlini, Luca and Kim, GaOn},
journal = {Review of Economic Design},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s10058-026-00400-z},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-026-00400-z}
}