Dynamic Games and Applications Computational Mathematics

Introspection dynamics with mutation in additive games

Harry Foster, Vince Knight, Sebastian Krapohl
Springer Nature · 2026-08-25 · DOI 10.1007/s13235-026-00715-0

Abstract

Abstract Cooperation in heterogeneous groups, where individuals differ in resources, productivity, and behavioural responsiveness, underpins collective action across social and biological systems. Introspection dynamics is a learning rule suited to such asymmetric settings: at each time step a randomly selected player compares their current payoff to the payoff an alternative action would have given, and switches with a probability increasing in the difference. We extend introspection dynamics to include mutation , where a selected player adopts an action with payoff-independent, player-specific probabilities, together with player-specific selection intensities. From the extended dynamics we rederive and generalise the results of Couto and Pal for additive games, those in which the payoff difference a player evaluates when considering a switch is independent of the other players’ actions: the stationary distribution remains a product measure, and each player’s long-run cooperation probability has an explicit form in terms of their own payoffs, selection intensity, and mutation probabilities alone. We consider the heterogeneous public goods game, where $$N$$ N players may differ in their contributions, public goods multipliers $$r_i$$ r i , and selection intensities $$\beta _i$$ β i ; the long-run cooperation probability admits a closed form with $$N$$ N terms rather than $$2^N$$ 2 N . Several structural consequences follow: a player-specific cooperation threshold at $$r_i = N$$ r i = N under symmetric mutation, a neutral-drift regime in which cooperation is governed entirely by mutation bias, and a mutation-selection balance in which aggregate cooperation is affine in the mutation rate, interpolating between selection and neutrality. Mutation also regularises the strong-selection limit $$\beta _i\rightarrow \infty $$ β i → ∞ , where the mutation-free dynamics degenerate.

Read at publisher →