Review of Industrial Organization Management of Technology and Innovation

Strategic Commitment and Vertical Contracting in Location Choices

Kourandi, Frago, Vettas, Nikolaos
Springer Nature · 2026-11-01 · DOI 10.1007/s11151-026-10070-4

Abstract

We model a linear city with duopoly both upstream and downstream. Consumers pay a transportation cost when they buy from a retailer and so do retailers when they buy from a wholesaler. All location and pricing decisions are endogenous. When the wholesalers choose their locations first, they locate closer to the center relative to the retailers, and relative to when all firms move simultaneously. Each wholesaler locates closer to the center in order unilaterally to strengthen the strategic position of its retailer by pulling that retailer towards the market center; however, this results, in equilibrium, in a greater intensity of competition. All firms locate farther away from the market center and industry profits are higher under linear pricing relative to two-part tariffs and, in turn, relative to vertical integration.

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