Economic Theory Bulletin Economics and Econometrics

Affective conversations

Heifetz, Aviad
Springer Nature · 2026-09-25 · DOI 10.1007/s40505-026-00320-9

Abstract

We study affective interactions with two individuals, i.e. interactions where each individual’s wellbeing depends on their own choice and on the other individual’s wellbeing. We show that when the affective interaction induces a standard game with utility functions that depend on the choice profile, these utility functions are ‘intertwined’ in a specific way that we characterize. Next, we compare the continuous-time gradient dynamics in the affective interaction, where each individual takes as given the other’s wellbeing, with the corresponding dynamics in the induced game, where each takes the other’s choice as given. We prove that the trajectories of the two dynamics proceed along the same paths, but in potentially different speeds and possibly reverse directions. With an example, we show how such direction reversal might lead to the loss of a beneficial limit point when passing to the dynamics in the induced game. We interpret the result as pertaining to the evolution of language, with trajectories of the dynamics representing conversations—in childhood with the dynamics in the affective interaction, and in adulthood with the dynamics in the induced game.

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