Information Sharing and Market Competition on Online Marketplaces

The Journal of Geometric Analysis · Springer Nature · 2026-09-26 · DOI: 10.1007/s11424-026-5565-1

Аннотация

This paper investigates demand information sharing in agency channels across four supply chain structures defined by upstream competition (common vs. independent manufacturer) and downstream competition (monopoly vs. duopoly agent). Incorporating endogenous sales effort and heterogeneous signal accuracy, the authors characterize the equilibrium sharing decisions of all supply chain members and evaluate their social welfare implications. The authors show that information sharing is always a Pareto improvement under the Monopoly/Common structure, while the agent optimally shares with at most one manufacturer under the Monopoly/Independent structure when competition is sufficiently intense. Under the Duopoly/Common structure, asymmetric signal precision introduces endogenous free-riding incentives that may shift the equilibrium from full sharing to partial sharing, a result that cannot arise under symmetric accuracy assumptions. The Duopoly/Independent structure uniquely achieves full sharing as the dominant equilibrium, with private incentives perfectly aligned with the social optimum. A cross-structure welfare analysis further reveals that supply chain organizational form is a first-order determinant of system efficiency, while the efficiency improvement from information sharing is remarkably uniform across all structures regardless of organizational configuration. These findings provide actionable guidance for agency operators: Structural configuration should precede information policy design, and targeted interventions are warranted only in structures in which private and social incentives diverge.

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