CEO duality and EBITDA reporting: the moderating role of board governance

Schépens, Sébastien
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance · Springer Nature · 2026-10-29 · DOI: 10.1057/s41310-026-00436-1

Аннотация

This study examines the relationship between CEO duality and EBITDA-oriented reporting practices, as well as the moderating role of board governance mechanisms. Drawing on agency theory and the opportunistic perspective of non-GAAP reporting, the study argues that CEO duality increases managerial discretion and incentives to rely on EBITDA-oriented disclosures. Conversely, stronger board governance is expected to mitigate this relationship through more effective monitoring. Using probit regression models on a sample of European listed firms included in the STOXX Europe Large 200 over the 2020–2025 period, the results show that CEO duality is positively associated with the disclosure and use of EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, EBITDA-based ratios, and EBITDA-related compensation measures. The findings further indicate that board governance significantly moderates this relationship, with the conditional effects varying across governance mechanisms and becoming more constraining at moderate or high governance levels. This study contributes to the literature on non-GAAP reporting and corporate governance by highlighting EBITDA as a governance-related discretionary reporting instrument shaped by managerial incentives and monitoring effectiveness.

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