Dynamic Games and Applications Computational Mathematics

Population Games with Sub-Strategies and Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Learning

Matthew S. Hankins, Semih Kara, Nuno C. Martins, Murat Arcak
Springer Nature · 2026-02-17 · DOI 10.1007/s13235-025-00689-5

Abstract

Abstract We establish a modified notion of Nash equilibrium learning—convergence of the population state to the Nash equilibria set—in a generalization of the standard population games and evolutionary dynamics framework using system-theoretic passivity methods. In this setting, we allow each strategy to involve a sequence of sub-tasks that must be completed before strategy revision so long as the durations of the sub-tasks can be modeled with Erlang or exponential distributions. Furthermore, several canonical classes of natural learning rules are established and useful properties are derived.

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