Amir, Rabah, Evstigneev, Igor V., Potapova, Valeriya
Springer Nature ·
2025-12-18
· DOI 10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0
Abstract
The paper analyzes unbeatable strategies in a Cournot duopoly model with differentiated goods. We conduct an extensive comparative analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium strategies and unbeatable ones in this framework. This article focuses on an asymmetric model, extending the results previously obtained in the symmetric case.
Amir, Rabah, Evstigneev, Igor V., Potapova, Valeriya. Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly. // Economic Theory Bulletin. – 2025. – DOI: 10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0. – URL: http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0
Amir, Rabah, Evstigneev, Igor V, Potapova, & Valeriya (2025). Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly. Economic Theory Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0
Amir, et al. “Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly.” Economic Theory Bulletin, 2025. doi:10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0.
@article{Amir2025,
title = {Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly},
author = {Amir and Rabah and Evstigneev and V., Igor and Potapova and Valeriya},
journal = {Economic Theory Bulletin},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0},
url = {http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0}
}