European Journal of Law and Economics Law
Capitalising residual control: leasehold tenure and institutional risk in England and Wales
Abstract
This paper examines whether differences in residential property tenure regimes are systematically capitalized into housing values, framing leasehold tenure as an incomplete allocation of residual control rights. Drawing on property rights and incomplete contract theory, we conceptualize how split-interest ownership structures shift decision-making authority from occupiers to reversionary freeholders, generating transaction frictions, coordination costs, and institutional risks. To estimate the tenure-associated valuation differential, we apply a high-dimensional fixed effects hedonic pricing model to five million HM Land Registry transactions spanning 2000–2025. Our baseline specification identifies a robust reduced-form leasehold valuation discount of 17.33% at the sample mean. Dynamic annual estimates and rolling structural break analyses show that this discount varies substantially over time, widening sharply after 2016 and peaking in 2022. Cross-sectional evidence indicates that this temporal widening was concentrated within multi-unit flats, coinciding with the building-safety cladding crisis, whereas newly constructed properties remained largely insulated from legacy contractual frictions. A pronounced geographic asymmetry also emerges: leasehold properties in Greater London exhibit a valuation penalty (32.65%) more than double that observed elsewhere in England and Wales. Taken together, these findings provide a robust empirical benchmark for the valuation of divided control rights in residential property markets, with direct implications for ongoing commonhold and leasehold enfranchisement reforms.