International Journal of Game Theory Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules

Kitahara, Minoru, Okumura, Yasunori
Springer Nature · 2026-05-07 · DOI 10.1007/s00182-026-01000-5

Abstract

We examine a controlled school choice model in which students are divided into types and the distribution of admitted students influences schools’ priority structures. We introduce a general class of priority rules that represent priorities as weak orders (allowing ties) for each given assignment and satisfy three axioms: Preference for Diversity, Within-Type Ordering, and Distributional Consistency. This framework includes the adjusted scoring rule, which flexibly integrates reserves, quotas, and bonus-point rules while accounting for uncertainty in applicants’ types and scores. From such priority profiles, we construct choice functions that satisfy substitutability and size monotonicity. We show that the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with these functions yields matchings that are stable with respect to the original priority profiles and satisfy group strategy-proofness. Moreover, when priority profiles are restricted to linear orders for each given assignment, our mechanism yields a student-optimal stable matching.

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