This paper examines whether two bank risk-governance mechanisms – the board risk committee and the chief risk officer – operate as separate additive mechanisms or as a governance configuration. Using a hand-collected panel of 242 listed US commercial banks over 2016–2019, the study classifies 966 bank-year observations into four states: neither mechanism, risk committee only, chief risk officer only and both. Random-effects models with bank-clustered standard errors show that banks operating both mechanisms report lower return on equity and return on assets than comparable banks with neither, while formal additivity tests remain statistically insignificant. For insolvency risk, the chief-risk-officer-only state is associated with a lower Z-score, whereas the joint state is not. The findings question the view that more risk governance is automatically better and suggest that governance architecture should be evaluated as a configuration.
Using data on publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies from 1992 to 2019, we examine whether disparities between CEO and non-CEO executive pay affect banks’ liquidity creation. We find that banks with larger CEO pay gaps create more...
In this study, we use data from 22,822 women-led firms across 50 countries spanning 2010 to 2020 to challenge the belief that corporate political activities (CPAs) facilitate credit access. We demonstrate that CPAs do not improve access...
We study the effect of public-guaranteed loans (PGLs) on bank risk-taking during the COVID-19 pandemic in France. The presence of guarantee schemes may foster riskier lending, pushing banks to lend to riskier borrowers or worsening...
Our aim in this paper is to gain a better understanding of the potential moderating role of the peer effect in loan officers’ decision-making. We use data from a French cooperative bank with several business branches from 2012 to 2016...
We examine whether the discretionary governance practices of pension board of trustees have a significant impact on the returns of the plan’s invested assets. We construct a unique database of board practices by analyzing meeting...