Mixed financing strategies and coordination analysis under a partial trade credit contract

OPSEARCH · Springer Nature · 2026-10-29 · DOI: 10.1007/s10479-026-07443-z

Аннотация

This paper studies a financing and coordination problem in a capital-constrained supply chain consisting of one supplier, one electronic business (EB) platform, and one financially distressed retailer under stochastic demand. We formulate a three-tier Stackelberg game to analyze a partial trade credit (PTC) contract, under which the supplier provides only partial trade credit, while the EB platform finances the retailer’s remaining capital requirement. The model jointly characterizes the operational decisions such as the supplier’s wholesale price, the platform’s interest rate, and the retailer’s order quantity. We derive the equilibrium strategies of all supply chain members and examine how the trade credit ratio and the commission rate affect equilibrium outcomes. The results indicate that a high commission rate may incentivize the EB platform to provide interest-free financing. We further compare the proposed mixed financing scheme with pure trade credit financing and pure platform financing to identify the retailer’s financing preference. Additionally, we characterize the conditions under which the PTC contract coordinates the decentralized supply chain and yields Pareto improvements for all members. Finally, we extend the model to examine how debt priority affects operational decisions and profits in a multi-creditor setting. When the retailer has no initial capital, both the supplier and the EB platform can benefit from debt priority; however, when the retailer has positive initial capital, debt priority is not always advantageous to creditors.

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