Building coalitions among autonomous entities with conflicting performance, beliefs, and capabilities is one of the most significant challenges in multi-agent systems. Optimal set partitioning of the players to maximise social welfare and distribute the cooperation payoff are two main research streams in this context. Nevertheless, achieving an integrated procedure for stable coalition formation remains a significant challenge in reaping the benefits of cooperation. Accordingly, this paper models a stable and optimal coalition structure using a solution concept in cooperative game theory. To do so, we use an exact mixed-integer model based on the least-core solution concept for a class of cooperative games known as the economic lot-sizing (ELS) game. We test the model on a complex problem in Iran’s rebar retail industry, an emerging economy, and validate it using Design of Experiments (DOE). The proposed model results indicate that the best condition for coalition formation among rebar retailers occurs when retailers’ demand is high across periods and joint ordering yields the lowest price from the closest supplier. Moreover, social welfare improvement is greater in this situation than in other scenarios.
Razghandi, Elham, Amoozad Mahdiraji, Hannan, Mehregan, Mohammadreza et al. Optimal coalition structures in supply chains: a cooperative game approach to economic lot-sizing in emerging markets. // Operations Management Research. – 2026. – DOI: 10.1007/s12063-026-00616-w. – URL: http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s12063-026-00616-w
Razghandi, Elham, Amoozad Mahdiraji, Hannan, Mehregan, Mohammadreza, Garza-Reyes, & Jose Arturo (2026). Optimal coalition structures in supply chains: a cooperative game approach to economic lot-sizing in emerging markets. Operations Management Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12063-026-00616-w
Razghandi, et al. “Optimal coalition structures in supply chains: a cooperative game approach to economic lot-sizing in emerging markets.” Operations Management Research, 2026. doi:10.1007/s12063-026-00616-w.
@article{Razghandi2026,
title = {Optimal coalition structures in supply chains: a cooperative game approach to economic lot-sizing in emerging markets},
author = {Razghandi and Elham and Mahdiraji, Amoozad and Hannan and Mehregan and Mohammadreza and Garza-Reyes and Arturo, Jose},
journal = {Operations Management Research},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s12063-026-00616-w},
url = {http://link.springer.com/openurl/fulltext?id=doi:10.1007/s12063-026-00616-w}
}
Effective teamwork depends on teams’ ability to coordinate time. Although research distinguishes between explicit and implicit forms of team temporal coordination, relatively little is known about how these mechanisms interact to...
The Queen Elisabeth Competition is a renowned international music competition that identifies and promotes exceptional classical musicians. In each of the three rounds, a panel of judges gives numerical scores to candidates. The rule of...
In large-scale group decision making (LSGDM), traditional clustering methods typically rely on a single distance metric, ignoring both intra-cluster compactness and inter-cluster separation, and often fail to adaptively determine the...
Group decision-making (GDM) under social networks faces challenges from asymmetric interactions among decision-makers (DMs) and unconnected components. This paper proposes a consensus-reaching mechanism based on directed...
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute to economic growth, employment, and innovation, yet many in fragile economies struggle to sustain financial performance. This study examines the direct relationships between...